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THE BOILING POT OF LAWYER CONFLICTS
IN BANKRuPTcY
Charles W Wolfram1
I take up here only two modest pieces of the current puzzle of lawyer conflicts
of interest in bankruptcy practice. One involves the decision of the American
Law Institute (hereinafter "ALI") to sidestep the entire field in the course of
drafting its Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (hereinafter "Restate-
ment").2 The other involves the decision of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission (hereinafter "NBRC") to refuse to recommend that Congress do
anything at all major to disturb existing law in the same realm. Either the law of
lawyer conflicts in bankruptcy has been blessed in its present state by two presti-
gious and influential organizations, or something else is going on. I suggest here
that something else is indeed afoot in the law and in legal institutions, and it
doubtless will continue.
First, with respect to the ALI, why would an enterprise with the global title of
"Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers" not take up a topic as important,
confused, and worthy of addressing as that concerning the conflicts problems of
lawyers who represent clients in bankruptcy? As is amply proved, if by nothing
else, by several papers in this Symposium, there is widespread disagreement
about starting points, not to mention finish lines, with respect to lawyer conflicts
in bankruptcy. Judicial decisions on the subject sometimes reflect what may
charitably be characterized as chaos. A significant number reflect, in my eyes,
1. Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor, Cornell Law School. The author serves, yet, as the chief reporter for
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers of the American Law Institute. Nothing stated here necessarily
reflects the position of the Institute.
2. The most recent preliminary edition of the Restatement dealing with conflicts is RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Hereafter, I will refer to all drafts as
"Restatement," with appropriate notation of the various dated drafts. Proposed final draft number 1 was finally
approved, as amended at the 1996-98 annual meetings, at the conclusion of discussion of the Restatement at the
May 1998 annual meeting. The final hard-bound version of the Restatement will be published sometime in
1999.
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antediluvian concepts of conflicts analysis.' At the very least, it seems to be
common ground that "[r]ecent years have seen increasingly rigorous application
of the conflicts rules by courts and state bar ethics committees .... '" The num-
ber of bankruptcy filings in recent decades has skyrocketed, meaning that more
lawyers (and a correspondingly larger number of judges) are forced to grapple
with conflicts imponderables that may be encountered in bankruptcy. The stakes
are also high, at least for the lawyers.' As is now commonplace, a lawyer or law
firm whose conflict antennae are not precisely calibrated with those of a judge,
who might pass on the issue, may be forced to forfeit the entire fee that otherwise
would be due for extensive work on the matter. It is also well known that the
judicial decision will come down many months or years after the lawyer will
have been forced to decide whether to represent the bankruptcy client. Although
3. A prominent example is the persistence in some decisions of invocation of the hollow concept of
"appearance of impropriety" as the test to determine the existence of a bankruptcy conflict. See, e.g., In re
Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180-82 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[S]ection 327 is intended ... to address the appearance of
impropriety as much as its substance .... The question is not necessarily whether a conflict exists ... but
whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one, renders the lawyer's interest materially adverse to the
estate or the creditors."); In re Blinder Robinson & Co., 131 B.R. 872, 878 n.2 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) ("The
need to avoid the appearance of impropriety forms the baseline for determining whether a party is disinterested
under... the Bankruptcy Code ...."), as modified, No. 90-K-1670, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12290 (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 1991); cf, e.g., In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 97-638-RRM, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis
1308, at *21 (D. Del. Jan. 27, 1998); rev'd, In re Marvel, 140 E3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998); on remand, In re Marvel,
222 B.R. 243 (D. Del. 1998)
(However, the key issue raised by the present motion [by the court appointed trustee to retain his own
law firm as counsel to the estate] is not whether there exists a conflict of interest, or whether there
exists an 'appearance of impropriety.' It is whether [the law firm], in light of its [unrelated] representa-
tion of [a potential defendant to claims of the debtor], can fairly be said to be disinterested.).
For useful, recent analyses of the unsettled state of bankruptcy conflicts decisions, in addition to key works
cited elsewhere herein, see generally Symposium: Bankruptcy Ethics, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (1997);
Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential Conflicts of Interest
in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913 (1994); William I. Kohn & Michael P. Schuster, Deciphering Conflicts of
Interest in Bankruptcy Representation, 98 COM. L.J. 127 (1993); John T. Cross, Conflicts of Interest in
Bankruptcy Representation, 1 J. BANKR. & PRAC. 233 (1992); Richard L. Epling & Claudia G. Sayre,
Employment of Attorneys by Debtors in Possession: A Proposal for Modification of the Existing Attorney
Eligibility Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Existing Conflict of Interest Provisions of the Ethical
Rules of Professional Responsibility, 47 Bus. LAW. 671 (1992); R. Craig Smith, Note, Conflicts of Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Increase Confidence in the Bankruptcy System, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 1045 (1995); Christopher M. Ashby, Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a) and Potential Conflicts
of Interest--A lways or Never Disqualifying?, 29 Hous. L. REV. 433 (1992); Karen J. Brothers, Comment,
Disagreement Among the Districts: Why Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Needs Help, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733 (1990).
4. ALAS Loss PREVENTION JouRNAL, May 1994, at 22.
5. As today's headlines announce, exposure of a bankruptcy lawyer to criminal liability is not out of the
question. Paul M. Barrett, How an Ex Milbank Partner Got Indicted, WALL ST. J., February 23, 1998, at B6
(account of impending trial of former member of New York City law firm for federal offense of failure to dis-
close conflict in filings with federal bankruptcy court in Milwaukee). Criminal convictions are uncommon, but
not unknown. E.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982)
(affirming conviction of lawyer for fraudulent use of mails to further lawyer's own undisclosed interests that
conflicted with those of client in non-bankruptcy representation).
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legal malpractice claims against bankruptcy lawyers apparently do not presently
loom large,' the potential exists for significant increase in such claims.
In a field bearing such characteristics, it would seem that the role of the ALI in
crafting its Restatement would necessarily include bankruptcy conflicts. Yet,
after initially ignoring the field and then taking a faltering start, the Institute pro-
poses now to withdraw entirely from the effort. The Restatement, in its most
recent edition,7 states, in the most studied way possible, that the Institute intends
to say nothing about this important field. Our inglorious retreat has hardly been
universally praised by bankruptcy lawyers. To the contrary, an effort was still
underway in early 1998 by bankruptcy practitioners within the ALI to have us
face at least the major issues.' The omission, as well as the false start, requires a
bit of explanation. I propose to provide that here, although it will only be natural
if my attempt to provide history proves more convincing to affected bankruptcy
lawyers than my defense of the course we have taken.
Second, just as the ALI was refusing to move on bankruptcy conflicts, the
NBRC was being advised by several lawyers representing large organizations of
bankruptcy lawyers that the present law of bankruptcy conflicts was unworkable
and needed serious overhauling. With near unanimity, a working group suggest-
ed a number of relatively major revisions (although it did not recommend the
most radical proposal for reform that was discussed by the group). As with the
ALI, the NBRC at first seemed interested in reform, but then also stepped back
and seems instead to have affirmed that all is well under the present law. In my
opinion, the initial instincts of the NBRC were more sound. Those events and
their implications I briefly canvass here.
I conclude with the thought that the last word has hardly been uttered on
lawyer conflicts in bankruptcy. Reform, of either the sudden or gradual variety,
will probably characterize the field in years to come.
I. HISTORY OF THE RESTATEMENT'S DEALINGS WITH BANKRUPTCY CONFLICTS
A. The Background of the Restatement Effort in General
What a restatement should appropriately attempt to do lies mainly in the eye of
the beholder. I have elsewhere sketched what I believe that objective ought to
be--agreeing with the position traditionally embraced by the ALI itself as official
policy.9 The key concept is that a restatement is not limited, as is sometimes sup-
6. See ALAS Loss PREVENTION JOURNAL, May 1994, at 21-22 (concern of loss-prevention counsel about
potential for bankruptcy conflict claims, despite fact that such claims historically have contributed less than 1%
of claims of national large-firm malpractice insurer). Cf ALAS News, Summer 1995, at 14 (report of malprac-
tice insurer's seminar program devoted to discussion of $2.1 billion claims filed against two New York City law
firms by creditors committee, although apparently not based on claim of conflict of interest).
7. See RESTATEMENT § 209 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) (finally approved, 1998).
8. See infra text accompanying note 32.
9. See Charles W Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETIcs 195 (1987); Charles W Wolfram, Bismarck's Sausages and the ALl's Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
817 (1998) (examining process by which Restatement has been produced); see also Charles W Wolfram, Legal
Ethics and the Restatement Process--the Sometimes-Uncomfortable Fit, 46 OKLA. L. Rv. 13 (1993) (examining
the overlaps and disconnects between everyday morality and the somewhat stylized morality of lawyer codes
and restatements on lawyers).
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posed--or at least as it is occasionally contended--to mechanical recitation of the
propounded view of a tabulated majority of American jurisdictions whose courts
have taken a position on an issue. Thus, it would clearly be competent for a
restatement to stake out the markers in an area which courts had not yet visited
or to attempt to clarify an area of the law in which courts have been able to pro-
ceed only tentatively or incompletely, or in which some courts have thoroughly
bungled the state of doctrine--perhaps in competing lines of decisions--as seems
true of several aspects of bankruptcy conflicts law." Restating bankruptcy con-
flicts law is complicated, but hardly precluded, by the fact that the law here is
plainly federal in nature and, in significant part, is compelled, or at least strongly
impelled, by statutory language or concepts. As a parallel example, in many
jurisdictions, statutes define the attorney-client privilege, but that has not deter-
red us from attempting a rather thoroughgoing restatement of the privilege."
Even more obviously, the law of lawyering in all jurisdictions is found mainly in
lawyer codes enacted with much the same legal force as statutes, but that has not
deterred us from attempting to restate the law in most of the areas covered by the
lawyer codes. In short, a proper view of the restatement process would by no
means preclude the ALI, on the ground of institutional incompetence, from
undertaking a thorough re-examination and, if appropriate, a proposed reworking
of bankruptcy conflicts law.
B. Restating Bankruptcy Ethics--Section 209 in Its Original and Reshaped Forms
At least at one point, we indeed felt that we possessed the competence, the spe-
cialized knowledge, and an adequate grasp of doctrinal subtleties to warrant a par-
tial excursion into the field of bankruptcy conflicts. Initially, however, we had
ignored bankruptcy conflicts. Early drafts, including the first version of the rele-
vant portions of Chapter 8 on conflicts generally, that were tentatively approved by
the ALI contained no explicit mention of the topic. 2 Section 209 did address the
conflict problems that may arise when a lawyer or a law firm represents one"3 or
10. As only one example, federal courts have taken strongly divergent views on whether a conflict in bank-
ruptcy may be disregarded if it is "merely potential" (in the sense that the harm threatened by the conflicting
interests would occur, if at all, only in the future). Compare, e.g., In re American Printers & Lithographers,
Inc., 148 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (rejecting "actual versus potential" distinction for bankruptcy
conflicts); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 BR. 742, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (same); In re Michigan
Gen. Corp., 78 B.R. 479, 484 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (same), with, e.g., In re Global Marine, Inc., 108 B.R.
998, 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) (representation of clients with "potentially conflicting interests" does not
violate Bankruptcy Code).
11. RESTATEMENT §§ 118-42 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (tentatively approved, 1996-97; finally
approved, 1998).
12. RESTATEMENT §§ 201-216 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) (tentatively approved, with the exception of §
216, in 1991); see also id. (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990) (first iteration of conflicts chapter, not all of which was
reached for discussion at the May, 1990 annual meeting).
13. Representing a single client in litigation can, of course, create a conflict if, for example, the client is a
plaintiff who opposes a defendant who, as a client in an otherwise unrelated matter, the lawyer or the lawyer's
firm represents in a transactional matter. E.g., In re Curtis, 656 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1995) (discipline of a lawyer
who represented a client in a small claims matter in court at same time that lawyer, as part-time government
lawyer, was engaged in criminal investigation of that client's delinquent taxes). The principle is stated in
Comment [8] to ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 (1983): "Ordinarily, a lawyer may not
act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly
unrelated .... " The "ordinarily" qualifier apparently refers only to the possibility of cure of the conflict
through appropriate consent by affected clients. The same principle is explicitly stated in Section 209(2). See
infra text accompanying notes 16-19.
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more of multiple clients in litigation, including complex litigation. In the first
public draft, the first subsection of Section 209 took the unremarkable position
that a lawyer in civil litigation could not represent multiple clients if a substantial
risk existed "that the lawyer's representation of one of the clients would material-
ly and adversely affect the lawyer's representation of another client."" That pro-
vision, although stated in somewhat different language, has proved relatively
non-controversial and has remained substantively unchanged through succeeding
public drafts.
15
What eventually proved problematic for bankruptcy lawyers was the second
subsection of Section 209. In its initial formulation, Section 209(2) stated the
then-unquestioned" proposition that a lawyer or law firm representing one client
may not sue (or otherwise litigate against) another present client.17 In its hard-
core applications, the rule that a lawyer representing one client may not sue
another is universally accepted in the lawyer codes and the judicial decisions.18
Where the rule becomes difficult to trace is in multi-party, multi-claim litigation.
To take an example from another, related realm, is it permissible for a lawyer to
represent a class of thousands of manufacturers if one or more members of the
class (not named as representatives and not otherwise clients of the firm) is the
opposing party in negotiations or litigation being conducted by other lawyers in
14. RESTATEMENT § 209(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990). The 1990 draft did not specifically address any
conflict issue involving complex litigation, other than a brief review of conflict issues in class actions. Id., cmt.
g.
15. Id. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991); Id. (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)
(Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provid-
ed in § 202 [on client consent], a lawyer in civil litigation may not: (1) represent two or more clients
in a matter if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one of the clients would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to another client in the matter .... ).
The 1996 Proposed Final Draft has been the last public draft to address (or not) the bankruptcy conflicts issues,
prior to the very recent appearance of Proposed Final Draft No. 2, supra note 7.
16. My Restatement co-reporter, Professor Thomas D. Morgan, has more recently created a stir in an article
arguing that a lawyer should often be able to sue an existing client. See Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current
Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1157 (1996). For a somewhat mild response, see Brian J. Redding, Suing a
Current Client: A Response to Professor Morgan, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487 (1997).
For what it is worth, my own view is that the traditional, and universally followed, per se rule invariably pro-
hibiting such representation is right. Professor Morgan's argument for a more relaxed rule starts from a narrow
factual assumption that many large corporations feign outrage when objecting to being sued by the same law
firm that represents them in an unrelated matter. Unless this is indeed common (which is unknown), Professor
Morgan may too readily extrapolate from the pathological to the usual. More generally, I think his empirical
speculations give too little weight to real problems of client-lawyer relationships that can arise if the same
lawyers, in a corporation's general counsel office, must deal with lawyers in a single law firm as both close
allies in one matter and adversaries in another. A fundamental sense of disloyalty, in most such situations,
would hardly seem feigned. In any event, given the universal acceptance of the per se rule, the lack of substan-
tial opposition to it when it was considered in connection with Section 209(2), and general impatience to con-
clude the Restatement project (see supra note 14), there does not seem much likelihood that the rule or Section
209 will be revisited in work yet to be done on the Restatement. That was indeed the case when the books were
closed on the Restatement at the conclusion of the May 1998 annual meeting of the ALI.
17. RESTATEMENT § 209(2), supra note 7: "[In the absence of effective consent of all affected clients] a
lawyer in civil litigation may not ... 2) represent one client to assert or defend a claim against another client
currently represented by the lawyer, even if the matters are not related."
18. E.g., RESTATEMENT § 209, cmt. c, note (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1998) (forthcoming); 1 GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & W WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.7:201 (1998 Supp.); CHARLES W WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.3.2 (1986). On some recent scholarly dissonance, see supra note 16. Texas is a
partial exception. See TEX. DIScIPL. R. PROF. CONDUCT, rule 1.06(b) (apparently broad exception permitting
suits against existing clients in some circumstances); but see In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1992) (federal court in Texas directed to disqualify lawyer who would sue own client, even in entirely unrelated
matter, despite arguable construction of Texas rule 1.06(b) to contary).
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the same firm?19 Our attempts to address such complex-litigation questions in
the initial draft was confined to an oblique look at class actions. Even on class
actions, our analysis was hardly penetrating in its discussion or complete in its
coverage. Nonetheless, the text was tentatively approved by the ALl membership
in the 1991 annual meeting." Normally, that would mean that the text remained
on the shelf until a final (and often largely perfunctory) review immediately prior
to completing the work as a whole. That was not to be the case with Section 209.
Not surprisingly, lawyer members of the Institute who practice extensively in
the bankruptcy area were unimpressed with the tentatively approved conflicts
chapter. Among the major watchdog groups that have followed the work of the
Restatement since its inception, the Business Law Section of the American Bar
Association has been particularly assiduous in its attention, sometimes through
public meetings attended by one or more reporters of the ALI's director. Their
work has been informed through reporting of liaison ALl members who have
been able to review early drafts as advisers to the Restatement or self-appointed
members of the ALI's "members consultative group" that receives and comments
upon preliminary drafts of material. Particularly interested in the Restatement's
treatment of bankruptcy issues has been the Business Bankruptcy Committee of
the ABA's Business Law Section and, separately, the National Bankruptcy
Conference.21 ALI members Susan M. Freeman and Gerald K. Smith, who are
active in both groups, led an effort through correspondence with myself, as chief
reporter, and Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., as director (and, of course, as a
well-known expert on legal ethics in his own right), to expand our treatment of
19. Compare, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 E2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984) (lawyer for two class
members disqualified where one client actively opposed settlement and the other client supported it); Molina v.
Mallah Org., Inc., 804 E Supp. 504, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (law firm attempting to represent class of employ-
ees had impermissible conflict due to firm's representation of union against which employees had potential
claims); Lewis v. National Football League, 146 ER.D. 5 (D.D.C. 1992) (law firm representing professional
football players' association in suit against individual players for breach of contract may not concurrently repre-
sent class of football players in antitrust suit against professional football league where class included several
players being sued by association); In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 133 ER.D. 425 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y.
1990) (fact that lawyer for proposed class of asbestos victims previously represented individual clients against
same defendant for asbestos related claims did not create disqualifying conflict).
On conflicts in class action representations in general, see, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1997)
(questioning why procedural law tolerates methods of group decision making that would not be tolerated for
other types of political decisions); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. RE. 1345 (1995) (proposing "constrained autonomy" model to limit mass tort class actions).
Older, but hardly dated, studies are Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); and Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982). Similar problems can arise, for example, in environmental liti-
gation involving potentially large numbers of"PRPs" (potentially responsible parties). Authority is scarce. See
Comm. Prof. & Jud. Ethics, St. B. Mich., Formal Op. R-16 (1993) (extensively canvassing conflict issues).
20. 68 A.L.I. PROC. 568 (1991) (membership vote tentatively approving, among others, Section 209 as print-
ed in Restatement (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991)); but cf supra note 11 (withholding of tentative approval of
Section 209 as printed in later Restatement (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
21. See 64 U.S.L.W. 2741 (May 28, 1996) ("Working with the National Bankruptcy Conference and with the
ethics subcommittee of the ABA Business Law Section's Business Bankruptcy Committee, the reporters crafted
a proposed addition to Section 209's comments .... ).
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bankruptcy conflicts in Section 209, at least in the comments. Not coincidental-
ly, Professor Hazard and I had listened, during an ABA program in August, 1995,
while several leading bankruptcy lawyers lamented the failure of the Restatement
to address bankruptcy conflicts issues.22
As the ALI's 1996 annual meeting approached, we worked on suggestions for
additional language and, in correspondence after Proposed Final Draft No. 1
appeared in March, 1996, worked out what we believed to be a modest (at least
brief) set of two amendments to add some content about bankruptcy conflicts.
The first amendment would have added a new comment c(ii) to Section 209.
The new comment c(ii) would have read as follows:
c(ii). Opposing client in multi-party litigation. Certain types of civil proceed-
ings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve multiple parties and multiple dis-
putes. The fact that one client holds a monetary claim against another client in a
bankruptcy proceeding is not necessarily "assertion" of a claim for purposes of
this Section. A claim is "asserted" or "defended" when a dispute concerning the
claim is involved. When there is no substantial likelihood that the proceeding
will devolve from administration of the estate into contested proceedings
between two or more clients, no conflict of interest under this Section is ordinar-
ily presented as between the clients. Further, a discrete conflict between two
clients, such as a dispute over the validity of a claim in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, may not disqualify a lawyer from representing one client with respect to
aspects of the case not involving the dispute between its clients. In addition to
general conflicts rules that may apply, a lawyer must also comply with statutory
regulations if more stringent, such as provisions of the bankruptcy code.23
A companion amendment would have revised the language of Section 209,
comment d(ii), as it appeared in the tentatively approved Tentative Draft Number
4 (1991), to read as follows:
d(iii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all possibly differing interests of
co-clients in complex and multi-party litigation involve material interests creat-
ing conflicts. Determination whether a conflict of material interests exists
requires careful attention to the context and other circumstances of the represen-
tation and in general should be based on factors such as the following: (1)
whether issues common to the clients' interests predominate, (2) circumstances
such as the size of each client's interest, and (3) the extent of active judicial
supervision of the representation. Among other considerations, assessment of
the existence of a conflict should take into account the requirements of material-
ity (see § 210 & Comment c(ii) thereof) and substantial risk (see id. & Com-
ment c(iii) thereto) of conflict. In addition to general conflict of interest rules
that may apply, a lawyer representing such multiple clients must also comply
with statutory regulations if more stringent.24
22. Id. ("At the ABA's annual meeting in Chicago [in 1995], Wolfram got an earful of comments from mem-
bers of the bankruptcy bar who complained that [section 209] dealing with conflicts in litigation did not ade-
quately address its implications for multiple representation in bankruptcy proceedings, which are a hybrid of
administration and litigation.").
23. See 73 A.L.I. PROC. 924-25 (1996) for the text of the proposed amendments.
24. See supra note 15. The former comment d(ii) would have been re-designated as comment d(iii) in antic-
ipation of adoption of the accompanying proposed new comment d(ii), described earlier.
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C. Restating Bankruptcy Conflicts Law--The ALl Punts
After the 1996Annual Meeting
At the 1996 annual meeting, however, we soon discovered that our drafting
efforts in the proposed amendments had been significantly unsuccessful. The
problem was that our acceptance of the notion of bankruptcy as some sort of
"administrative" process in the proposed new comment c(ii) (along with other
drafting problems)2 5 had obscured the potential for conflicts, rather than recog-
nizing and dealing with their lurking threat. It was pointed out that, by the time a
bankruptcy petition is filed and even if the accompanying plan of reorganization
receives the apparently warm support (or at least, not warm opposition) of all
affected parties, some very serious head-knocking (of a clear-conflict type) may
already have occurred in the process of developing the plan.2" Sliding by that
clear possibility by referring to the fact that the proceeding does not "devolve
from administration of the estate into contested proceedings between two or
more clients,"27 as in the proposed amendment, ignored that clear possibility for
pre-filing conflict. Strong and trenchant criticism from Judge Carolyn Dineen
King of the Fifth Circuit doomed the amendments and, as it turned out, any fur-
ther effort to restate bankruptcy conflicts law.2" (On reflection, at least one les-
son of the debate was that identity of one's adversary can be critical. Within and
outside the ALI, judges are revered as keepers of the legal professional flame.
When a highly-regarded and prominent judge, who, in this instance, is also a
member of the ALI's council,29 denounces a proposal in strong terms, its fate is
almost certainly sealed). Despite the restorative efforts of Susan Freeman," we
were eventually instructed by the ALI membership, by near unanimous voice
passage of Judge King's motion to recommit the proposed amendments, to
reconsider the matter carefully.
31
25. Chief among them was the flat-footed statement in the amendment proposing text for comment c(ii) that
"no conflict of interest under this Section is ordinarily presented" in described circumstances. At the very least,
the reference should have been limited to conflicts "under Subsection (2)." As the text indicates in its allusion
to "assertion" of claims and similar references, that Subsection was the only focus of discussion. On criticism
of the textual reference to the proceeding devolving from administration into contested litigation, see infra text
accompanying note 32.
26. 73 A.L.I. PROC. 389-92 (1996).
27. Id. at 389. One of the many traits that reporters have appreciated in Professor Hazard, in his role as
director of the ALl, has been his candor in acknowledging his own role. During the debate on the proposed
amendments to Section 209, he admitted that he had introduced the "administration" concept into the text of the
proposed amendment. See id. at 391 ("I have to say the word 'administration' was my word, and I take respon-
sibility for it... ").
28. Id. at 389-90, 392-93, 395 (1996) (remarks of Judge Carolyn Dineen King criticizing several aspects of
proposed amendments to Section 209).
29. See RESTATEMENT at ii (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (listing of Judge King as member of 61 -mem-
ber ALl Council).
30. 73 A.L.I. PROC. 393, 394 (1996).
3 1. While only the amendments were thus returned to the reporters for further consideration, Section 209
itself was later purposefully omitted from the material in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 that was (again, and as
revised) approved at the ALI's 1996 annual meeting. See id. at 438-39 (specific exclusion of Section 209 from
tentative approval of text, as printed in proposed final draft).
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In the end, we have recommended that the Institute punt on bankruptcy con-
flicts questions. We have done that by employing the Restatement convention of
stating that the Restatement takes no position on the question of the application
of conflicts concepts in bankruptcy. 2 The alternative was to undertake anew to
attempt to develop an adequately grounded and explicated statement of bank-
ruptcy conflicts, at least outlining and addressing the several most important
bankruptcy conflicts questions.
For reasons that I consider at a later point,33 we decided that the Restatement
was not, or at least no longer, the proper place to do so. Nonetheless, in view of
statements made elsewhere, I cannot quite leave it at that. I have heard it said,
for example, that our decisions to delete all bankruptcy language from Section
209 indicates that we accept the existing state of bankruptcy-conflicts law. That
would hardly constitute taking "no position" on the issue, and it is clearly not a
correct description of our "no position" position. Among other things, that read-
ing would assume uniformity of judicial doctrine under existing bankruptcy law
that plainly does not exist. 4 Or it would amount only to the odious position that
we "accepted" the unwieldy and conflicting cacophony of voices heard today on
bankruptcy conflicts. I have also heard it said that deletion of the bankruptcy
language proposed in 1996 from the language finally adopted in comment c(ii)
to Section 209 indicates rejection both of the language and of the assumptions
that informed the amendments rejected in 1996. That, too, is incorrect. Taking
no position entails agnosticism on all questions, including those we initially
attempted to address.3
32. RESTATEMENT § 209, cmt. c(ii), supra note 7:
c(ii). Opposing clients in multi-party litigation. Certain types of civil proceedings may involve
multiple parties and disputes, such as bankruptcy cases and proceedings involving environmental
liability for alleged polluted conditions. In general, in all multi-party situations, the lawyer must
comply with Subsection (1) and Section 201 generally, both before and after the filing of a formal
proceeding.
With respect to bankruptcy, there is substantial disagreement whether certain types of cases or
proceedings should be considered under the automatic rule of Subsection (2) or under the general
rule of Section 201 and, in general, whether general conflict of interest rules should be attenuated in
some instances. Such conflict issues may affect lawyers and law firms representing multiple
debtors, creditors of more than one class, creditors where there has been some representation of a
debtor or its principals, and the like. Tribunals must resolve such questions in light of a body of
decisions developed in the specific context of bankruptcy, and often the issues are controlled by
statute. The context involves transformation of a business relationship into one that is at least in part
controlled by different principles and rules, some of them of a fiduciary nature. The Restatement
takes no position on the applicability of Subsection (2) in the many situations that may arise in
bankruptcy.
After proposed text for Section 209, comment c(ii) appeared in the RESTATEMENT (Council Draft No. 13, Oct.
8, 1997), what can only be termed a last-ditch effort was mounted by several ALl members who practice bank-
ruptcy law to avoid the "punt" solution and add more meat to the Restatement's bare bones. The effort took the
form of several coordinated letters written to the ALI's director and to me as chief reporter. While the effort
had substantive merit, in my view, for reasons that are developed later, we decided to adhere to the position
reflected in the council draft and, now, in the version of comment c(ii) in Proposed Final Draft No. 2, supra.
33. Infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
34. Compare, e.g., authorities cited at supra note 10 (divergence on use of "potential conflict" concept).
35. On the other hand, the Restatement does state a general position on conflict analysis in Section 201. On
the implications of that general language for bankruptcy conflicts analysis, see infra text accompanying notes
39-43.
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D. Frustration on Another Front: The NBRC and Bankruptcy Conflicts
After the die was cast in the ALI not to take any position on bankruptcy issues
in the Restatement, entirely on my own (that is, divorced from my role as chief
reporter for the Restatement), I cooperated in a limited way with efforts launched
by bankruptcy lawyers Freeman and Smith, along with their fellow practitioners,
Donald S. Bernstein, Michael A. Bloom, and Bernard Shapiro, to attempt to per-
suade the Service to the Estate and Ethics Working Group of the NBRC, and
then the NBRC itself, to recommend that Congress repair the "disinterested"
standard in the Code and otherwise rationalize the law of bankruptcy conflicts.
That project, too, has thus far not borne fruit.
The eventual proposal" of the service and ethics working group to the NBRC
that I supported was to recommend that Congress delete the "disinterested"
requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 7 The proposal instead favored a standard'
that would have defined conflicts of interest for the lawyer of a debtor in posses-
sion essentially in the terms now employed in Section 2011 of the Restatement.
As with the Restatement, the new statutory standard would have focused the
bankruptcy court's inquiry on the question whether there was a substantial risk
that the asserted conflict would materially and adversely affect the lawyer's bank-
ruptcy representation. The proposal would leave untouched the statutory require-
ment that the lawyer disclose all potential conflicts to the bankruptcy court.40
Then and now, my view is that such a standard would both materially aid con-
flicts analysis by courts in bankruptcy cases and would hardly diminish appropri-
ate protection of client interests or the interests of other interested parties in
bankruptcy. The type of conflicts analysis required by the "substantial risk" stan-
dard expressed in Section 201 is hardly new. It is the standard reflected in the
36. Among other proposals considered by the service and ethics working group, but not approved or sent on
to the NBRC, was a wide-ranging proposal to revise conflict-of-interests for bankruptcy lawyers. This proposal
was not approved due to concern with Congressional reaction to a proposal that, to be effective, would have dis-
placed state ethics rules.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1994).
38. The service and ethics working group submitted several proposals to the NBRC. Its fourth proposal was
as follows:
The Bankruptcy Code should define conflict of interest for purposes of retention of professionals
under section 327. A professional has a conflict of interest if there is a substantial risk that such
professional's representation will be materially and adversely affected by the professional's own
interests or by the professional's duties to another person that currently employs or formerly
employed such professional or a third person.
<http.//www.abiworld.org/legislreview/hbrc.html>.
39. Section 201 provides as follows:
Unless all affected clients and other necessary persons consent to the representation under the
limitations and conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer may not represent a client if the representa-
tion would involve a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third
person.
RESTATEMENT § 201, supra note 2.
40. See Memorandum of May 1, 1997, to National Bankruptcy Review Commission and Professor Elizabeth
Warren (reporter/consultant to the Commission) from Professor Lawrence P. King (advisor to the Commission)
and Elizabeth I. Holland (Commission staff attorney) (on file with author) (forwarding recommendation of ser-
vice to the estate and ethics working group to full Commission); see also Memorandum of Aug. 22, 1996, to
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and Professor Elizabeth Warren (reporter/consultant to the
Commission) from Professor Lawrence P. King (advisor to the Commission) and Elizabeth I. Holland
(Commission staff attorney) (on file with the author) (earlier proposal on disinterest standard).
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lawyer code of every state" and has been employed by the large majority of
courts in disqualification cases in all realms of law practice. 2 Among other
areas of representation, it has proved durable and appropriately useful in protect-
ing against lawyer conflicts in representations involving clients with the highest
fiduciary demands exacted by the law. For example, those standards are
employed in resolving conflict questions involving such clients as trustees of
express trusts."3 Clearly, such clients bear fiduciary obligations much more
exacting than those borne by bankruptcy clients, such as debtors in possession.
It seems to me afortiori that such a standard is also appropriate for those clients
in bankruptcy who have responsibilities to others that are less impinged upon by
fiduciary obligations and more legitimately performed with partial attention to
the self-interest of the actor.
Use of the substantial risk standard of section 201 to assess conflict questions
now pursued under Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code would hardly prove
unsettling in bankruptcy conflicts law. Just as with conflicts formulations in
modem lawyers codes and judicial decisions in other areas, that very standard or
something much like it has already worked its way into bankruptcy decisional
law and has already been employed in some of the most notable of recent bank-
ruptcy-conflicts decisions. Those decisions include some--such as the In re
Leslie Fay Cos. decision44--that I have heard described, in debates before both the
ALI" and the Bankruptcy Commission, as important to uphold against the
claimed loosening of conflicts standards that adoption of a test based on Section
201 would, it is claimed, entail.4 In the end, while not entirely denigrating the
arguments of those who believe that the "disinterested" standard is both apt and
workable,47 I am persuaded that the contrary position' offers a better balance of
protection of appropriate public and private interests and respect for the rights of
clients to retain counsel of their choice.
41. See RESTATEMENT § 201, cmts. c-c(iv), notes, supra note 2.
42. Some conception of the range of practice areas in which the test of Section 201 has been employed may
be gained from a review of the judicial decisions cited in id., notes.
43. See generally Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law ofthe American BarAssociation, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 763, 839-
48 (1994) (review of several conflict problems that may arise in course of lawyer's representation of trustee of
express trust or other common-law fiduciary, with assumption that normal rules of conflict, including those of
Restatement Section 20 1, should and would apply; citing authorities).
44. In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525, 533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (law firm's violation of "disinterested"
standard of § 327(a) will be found "if it is plausible that the representation of another interest may cause the
debtor's attorney to act any differently than.., without that other representation.").
45. E.g., 73 A.L.I. PRoc. 390 (1996) (argument of Judge King praising Leslie Fay decision and urging that
ALI "not go back to the way the law was before 1979 and the way it is so badly spelled out in the legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code. I would hope that we would hold the line on where we have been.").
46. See infra text accompanying note 49.
47. E.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don't End It: The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement
for Debtor in Possession's Professionals, 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 291 (1998) (arguing for retention of disinterested
standard, with alteration in narrow instance of lawyer's own pre-filing claim for attorney fees).
48. E.g., Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganizing Cases, 48 S.C. L.
RE. 793 (1997) (arguing for thorough-going revision of disinterested standard).
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After some initial receptiveness among the NBRC's staff and, at one point, by
an apparent majority of the members of the NBRC, the conflicts-reform recom-
mendation was substantially beaten back in the final action of the NBRC in its
recommendations to Congress. This time, defeat of the bankruptcy lawyers came
primarily through the leadership of another Fifth Circuit judge, NBRC member
Judge Edith Hollan Jones.49 Evidently, the Fifth Circuit bench includes several
judges who think bankruptcy conflicts rules are just about right. I strongly dis-
agree. In my view, the eventual NBRC report, with its very limited proposal for
change (limited to the problem of lawyers and other professionals with pre-bank-
ruptcy bills that were not yet paid), was not helpful in its failure to address the
situation of bankruptcy conflicts more broadly."t I have not followed what effort
is being made in Congress on review of the NBRC report, but I know that inter-
ested lawyers and others have discussed trying there one more time.
II. THE RESTATEMENT PROCESS AND BANKRUPTCY CONFLICTS
I conclude with some thoughts about how the ALI's restatement process
worked in the instance of bankruptcy conflicts. The outcome of the debate with-
in the ALl was, to my mind, and at least in the circumstances in which the issue
arose, the correct one. I say that from the chastened position of one who initially,
and for some time, believed that the Restatement could address that tangled area
of conflicts law and propose resolution to at least one of its more vexing prob-
lems. The reasons are several.
First, restating lawyers' law in any field requires an adequate grasp of judicial
doctrine, terms of reference, concepts of appropriate law practice, and, in gener-
al, the contexts" in which lawyers practice and in which judgments about the lim-
its applicable to lawyer actors must be made. Those considerations are important
in any area of client conflicts. At the very least, knowing the area is important in
understanding instinctively how differing interests of clients may emerge,
whether subtly or frontally. One who restates must also be able to use language
that cabins potentially large concepts within appropriate limits and, generally, to
avoid creating misunderstanding about recommended directions of analysis.
49. E.g., Memorandum of April 21, 1997, from Judge Edith H. Jones and Professor Todd J. Zywicki to
National Bankruptcy Review Commission on Proposed Standard on Conflicts of Interest (on file with author)
(memorandum extensively attacking proposal of service and ethics working group). Judge Jones also had the
support of a particularly influential ally, Jerry Patchan, the director of the executive office for United States
Trustees. See Letter from Jerry Patchan to Brady C. Williamson, chairman of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission (May 14, 1997) (on file with author) (agreeing with analysis and recommendations of Judge Jones
and Professor Zywicki in their memorandum).
50. The NBRC's final report to Congress of October 20, 1997, limited its review of conflicts to the impor-
tant question of lawyers (and other professionals, such as accountants) who the debtor in possession wished to
retain, but who had as-yet unpaid bills for pre-bankruptcy services (making them general creditors of the
estate). The NBRC's Recommendation 3.3.3 was that "Section 1107(b) should be amended to provide that a per-
son should not be disqualified for employment under § 327 solely because such person holds an insubstantial
unsecured claim against or equity interest in the debtor. Section 327 and § 101(14) should remain unchanged."
3.3.3 Qualifications of Professionals Under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b). From <http://162.140.225.1/report/O3recomm.htnl>.
51. The importance of the context law practice has been best formulated in a seminal article by Professor
Wilkins. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 469 (1990).
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Frankly, as discussed above, 2 we fell short on those objectives in formulating
what became the 1996 proposed amendments to Section 209.
Second, perhaps the greatest obstacle to a thorough and satisfying restatement
of the law of bankruptcy conflicts is its present state of volatility. While some
may debate the point, it seems evident to me that the decisional law of bankrupt-
cy conflicts is in a state of rapid and thus, necessarily, unstable development.
Many bankruptcy courts are rendering decisions which, no matter how justifiable
as a matter of bankruptcy history, bankruptcy policy, or statutory formulation,
have moved far ahead of bankruptcy practice and theretofore-existing bankruptcy
precedents. In the process, lawyers in many firms have felt a strict judicial rap
on the knuckles and pocketbook. Those lawyers and their sympathizers feel,
often with some justification, that the groundbreaking decisions have failed to
acknowledge that the asserted conflict wrong that the lawyer committed was the
known, prevailing practice of reputable bankruptcy lawyers (or at least of many
or most of them) until the innovative decisions were rendered. Such pain is, of
course, inevitable in the process of legal reform through groundbreaking judicial
decisions. And such decisions have occasionally characterized the last decade or
so of increasingly rigorous application of conflicts standards and remedies in
bankruptcy. The volatile state of bankruptcy conflicts makes the task of restating
its basic premise one that would necessarily prove contentious and difficult--con-
ditions that do not bode well for passage by the ALI of wide-ranging and reform-
minded proposals, in the best of circumstances.
A related problem of volatility is that the effort to make what, in retrospect,
can be seen only as very modest revisions to Section 209 of the Restatement
occurred at the same time that the NBRC had begun its work and at a time when
questions were being raised within the NBRC and outside it about possible revi-
sion of the "disinterested" standard of § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.5" In the
field of bankruptcy conflicts, as with so many other reform efforts in law (and
elsewhere), the problem is one of educating judges and other skeptics who may
be tempted to believe instinctively that any attempt to reform existing bankruptcy
conflicts law is an attempt to return to a dreaded area of corrupt and mischievous
administration of bankruptcy. Such suspiciousness clearly emerged during the
debate on Section 209 at the 1996 ALl annual meeting. At least as some argu-
ments were framed, suspicion was cast on the motives of bankruptcy lawyers
52. Supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
53. When I was first contacted about serving as a consultant to the Service to the Estate and Ethics Working
Group of the NBRC in late May, 1996, I was sent a set of issues lists that, as I understand, had been circulated
among NBRC members and staff. Letter from Christine Wollaston-Loury, faculty assistant to Professor
Elizabeth Warren (May 29, 1996) (on file with author). An enclosed list of issues for the service and ethics
working group included the following:
Should the 'disinterestedness' standard be relaxed? ... Should parties be able to waive disinterested-
ness requirements? ... Are potential, rather than actual, conflicts sufficient to disqualify counsel?..
. Should rules enacted in the Bankruptcy Code supersede local regulation under canons of ethics and
disciplinary rules? ... Does the disqualification of an individual in a law firm disqualify the entire
firm? ...
Clearly, the ambition of the working group was to raise very fundamental issues about bankruptcy conflicts.
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interested in reforming bankruptcy conflicts law."' With due allowance for
hyperbole in argument, I believe the charge that bankruptcy lawyers were
attempting to revise the Restatement to remove themselves from its conflicts
strictures--although clearly not an accurate portrayal of motivation--was warrant-
ed, in a sense, by what I was soon convinced was the unfortunate language of the
Section 209 proposals.55 In fact, however, I have been impressed by the assidu-
ous care and resolve shown by lawyer proponents of reform in bankruptcy con-
flicts in preserving what, to me, seems to be a rock-hard resistance to conflicts.
Unfortunately, those characteristics were probably unknown to an ALI audience
hearing brief argument on complex and unfamiliar issues."
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the timing was wrong. For whatever rea-
son, bankruptcy lawyers rallied late to attempt to deal with their perception of the
potential importance of the Restatement for their field, or at least to the fact that
the reporters had misfired on earlier, general assurances that they would attempt
to address the area of bankruptcy conflicts. 7 Work on the Restatement began in
1985-86 and, as with any such project, the lawyers' restatement has been a time-
consuming and absorbing exercise for both the reporters and the ALl. Frankly,
both personal and institutional fatigue and ennui had set in by 1996. When the
issue was first raised in a major way at the 1996 annual meeting, the ALl no
longer had the appetite for wide-ranging excursion into a specialized area of law
practice. Many ALI members doubtless recalled the arguably ill-advised deci-
sion of the ALl council several years earlier to digress elaborately into the law of
lawyer work product, as fervently urged by lawyer members of the ALI who spe-
54. See 73 A.L.I. PRoc. 389 (1996) (remarks of Judge Carolyn Dineen King)
(I know that the bankruptcy lawyers have assiduously pursued the proposition that they would like to
be carved out of this Restatement, and we have, I think quite properly, resisted that, and I hope we
will to our dying day. But I believe that, with the way this has been drafted, they have been carved
out.).
55. See supra text accompanying note 38.
56. While the point may be largely academic at this stage, acceptance by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission of the proposal to recommend replacement of the statutory disinterested standard with the sub-
stantial risk standard of Section 201 would have strengthened conflict norms in certain areas (at least in certain
courts), for example, by eliminating the "merely potential" excuse for ignoring conflicts. See supra note 39.
57. The only mention that I have found of bankruptcy conflicts at the 1991 annual meeting at which Section
209 was first discussed by the AL, as a whole, is nonetheless important. ALl member William Knight
Zewadski of Florida, whom I know well to be a bankruptcy practitioner, raised an issue concerning whether
representation of multiple creditors in the "limited pie" situation of bankruptcy was intended to be included
within the statement (in RESTATEMENT § 209, cmt. d(i) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991)) that a conflict may exist
when multiple claimants assert claims against a "defendant [who] lacks sufficient assets to meet all of the dam-
ages claims... ." See 68 A.L.I. PROC. 449 (1991) (remarks of William Knight Zewadski). Mr. Zewadski went
on to refer broadly, and somewhat dismissively (for purposes of the Restatement), to the rapidly-developing law
of bankruptcy conflicts:
I would also mention, as a corollary to that, that under Title II U.S.C. §§ 327 and 1107, a great
body of law is developing about creditors' counsel later representing the debtor and the different
representations that come in connection with committee representation in bankruptcies. That is
evolving so quickly I would suggest you only refer to it, rather than try to sort it out at this point.
Thank you.
On re-reading the discussion, I can see that the reporters responded in a way that Mr. Zewadski and other bank-
ruptcy lawyers well might have taken to be an undertaking to look further at the area of bankruptcy conflicts.
Id.
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cialized in litigation. 8 A particular piece of bad timing was that the impetus for
visiting bankruptcy issues finally reached receptive ears within the ALI only
after the text of what became Proposed Final Draft Number 1 of the Restatement
had already gone to the printer (timing for which I, of course, am largely respon-
sible). Thus, the proposals put forward at the 1996 annual meeting necessarily
took the form of the suggested amendment to Section 209. Moreover, the
amendments were quite modest in scope, ill-drafted in some important respects
(in part due to the lack of opportunity for the normal and elaborate process of
multiple-draft and multiple-layer review by several groups within the ALI"), and
bore the unfortunate appearance of an attempt to steal a march on those con-
cerned to maintain high standards of legal ethics among bankruptcy practition-
ers. A complicating and complementary factor was that efforts were already
being made (by some of the same persons who pushed for reform within the
ALl) within the NBRC to reform bankruptcy legislation on lawyer conflicts,
60
perhaps strengthening the impression of marches being stolen.
III. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY CONFLICTS REFORM
The ALI's institutional situation and the bad timing that afflicted the 1996
attempt to introduce consideration of bankruptcy conflicts into the Restatement
have meant the end of efforts to restate that subject in that form. The failure to
obtain the support of the NBRC for significant change to § 327(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code was another unfortunately missed opportunity for reform. But
the law of bankruptcy conflicts, as it matures, will necessarily confront the need
for further adjustment.
As nature abhors a vacuum, so law abhors irrationality, and there is too much
of that now in the still-developing law of bankruptcy conflicts to warrant the
belief that the area has reached some sort of stasis in which it seems likely that
change will not occur. Efforts will undoubtedly continue to be made to reform it.
Of course, it is conceivable that appropriate and adequate reform will occur
through the ongoing development of what can properly be termed the common
58. In the initial plan of the Restatement, work-product was addressed merely through a single-section basic
review of the relevant law. See RESTATEMENT § 136 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989) (section printed for discussion
only). As indicated in that volume, see id. xv, xx, the ALl Council, at its meeting in October and December,
1989, had withheld approval of Section 136 for consideration of expanding the bare-bones treatment into "an
exhaustive consideration of the doctrine." Id. at xv. An additional associate reporter, Professor Linda S.
Mullenix of the University of Texas School of Law, was recruited specifically for the purpose of preparing a
reporter's draft of the topic and then participating in presentation of what became successive drafts at several
meetings of the ALI's adviser and member consultative groups, as well as to the Council and at two annual
meetings. The eventual material, sadly much reduced in length, was brought to the membership in
RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992). See 69 A.L.I. PROC. 358-404, 423-63 (1992) (annual meeting dis-
cussion of tentative draft no. 5 provisions on work product immunity sections). The material was reprinted, as
revised, in RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1993). They were discussed again at the 1993 annual meeting
and tentatively approved. See 70 A.L.I. PROC. 365-79 (1993) (completion of discussion of most sections on
work product immunity). A few final work-product matters were again presented in RESTATEMENT (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996) and discussed for the final time at the 1996 annual meeting. See 73 A.L.I. PROC. 337-
40(1996).
59. See Wolfram, supra note 9, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, at 201 (description of submitting restatement
drafts to reporters and director, then in preliminary draft form to adviser and members consultative groups, then
in council draft form to ALl Council, then in tentative draft (or similar) form to members at annual meeting).
60. See infra pp. 110-11.
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law of bankruptcy conflicts--continuing development of the law through judicial
decisions which, although ultimately based on the Bankruptcy Code, frequently
seem to be shaped more by the holdings and talk in other judicial decisions than
by the raw language of the Code. More likely, thoroughgoing reform will require
legislation: Both continuing judicial development and reforming legislation are
possible future developments, if the latter is not entirely likely. Clearly, the pot
of bankruptcy conflicts will continue to boil long after the failed efforts at a
reform within the ALI and the NBRC have been forgotten by all but those who
were intimately involved in those efforts.
